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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
further reasoned that it was improbable that this result was intended by the
settlor.
WX'ile the result in this case reduced the income of the income beneficiaries
because of the provision in the trust instrument allocating stock dividends to the
estate of the settlor, the opeiation of the rule of this case in the ordinary trust
will cause shares issued in this manner to go to principal.54 Therefore, in general,
this case effects no substantial harm "o the beneficiaries of a trust agreement,
while following the established law of this state.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Separation Agreements--Breach of Covenant Not to Molest
In Borax v. Borax,' the plaintiff-wife and defendant-husband had a separation
agreement containing a covenant that "neither party shall, in any manner or
form whatever, molest or trouble the other." It is alleged that the defendant
breached this covenant by obtaining a Mexican divorce without jurisdiction,
purporting to marry another woman, and giving his name to her child. Based
on this alleged breach, the plaintiff brought an action to set aside the existing
separation and another action for separation on grounds of adultery or on the
grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment.
The Special Term, holding that no molestation was established, dismissed
the complaint on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. 2 The Appellate Division3 assumed molestationbut held that the
"molestation clause" was an independent covenant and a breach of this clause was
not a rescission of the separation agreement. 4 Their judgment was, therefore, for
afflirmance, because an existing separation agreement containing a valid and
subsisting provision for support and maintenance is a bar to a subsequent
action for separatiori. 5
Historically, the "molestation clause" was used exclusively to prevent a
separated spouse from compelling the restoration of conjugal rights. As the law
favors resumption of marital relations, such clauses were of doubtful validity and,
54. N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW §17-a states that unless otherwise provided for all stock dividends go to principal. (Effective as to instruments exe-

cuted after effective date of statute.)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

4 N.Y.2d 113, 172 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1958).
N. Y. R. Civ. PRAc. 106, subd. 4.
Borax v. Borax, 3 A.D.2d 404, 161 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1st Dep't 1957).
Fearon v. Aylesford, 14 Q.B.D. 792 (1884).
Drane v. Drane, 207 App. Div. 217, 201 N.Y.Supp. 756 (1st Dep't 1923).
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therefore, considered independent covenants so as not to vitiate an entire
separation agreement.6 Today, there is authority recognizing molestation in a
broader sense and the perfect validity of molestation clauses when applied to
other than the historic area.7 Hence, the question posed by this case to the Court
of Appeals is, "If molestation can be construed as a broad term, appearing in a
valid covenant of a separation agreement, must this covenant be still considered
as independent, or may it be considered a dependent covenant such as visitation
rights?"8
The Court of Appeals differentiated visitation rights from "molestation
clauses" on the basis of historical growth and a closer connection of the support
provision ,with a visitation right. A possible example of this closer connection,
appearing to this writer, could be the utilization of the visitation right by the
separated spouse, to perceive if the support payments were actually utilized as
agreed.
Continuing, the Court said, "Consistency requires that a covenant against all
kinds of molestation should be treated as independent." Consistency of law, in
the opinion of the writer, is the virtuous end result of similarily reasoned cases,
but is not a reason for a decision itself. The case is justified, in actuality, by the
lack of any benefits to be derived from a change from the historic pattern. As
the Court pointed out, separated spouses are a troublesome relationship where
bitter invectives or humiliating behavior can be expected. If such acts were
allowed to become a litigous basis for ending a separation agreement, the effect
would be to destroy their primary objective-some stability wihere little appears
to exist. Such destruction is unnecessary inasmuch as protection against grievous
molestation is still provided the spouse, based on tort law or upon the independeiit
covenant itself.
Support Order for Resident Spouse Against Whom Ex-Parte Divorce Is Given
Section 1170-b of the New York Civil Practice Act9 allows a wife to bring
an action for support and maintenance after an ex parte divorce decree is obtained
6.
7.
(1953),
8.
9.

Landes v. Landes, 94 Misc. 486, 159 N.Y. Supp. 586 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
Lindey, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANT-NuPTAL CONTRACTS 108-109
also proclaims such covenants are to be considered independent.
Duryea v. Bliven, 122 N.Y. 567, 25 N.E. 908 (1890).
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §1170-b provides:
In an action for divorce, separation or annulment, or
for a declaration of nullity of a void marriage, where the
court refuses to grant such relief by reason of a finding by
the court that a divorce, annulment or judgment declaring
the marriage a nullity had previously been granted to the
husband in an action in which jurisdiction over the person
of the wife was not obtained, the court may, nevertheless,
render in the same action such judgment as justice may
require for the maintenance of the wife ...

